Welfare, Stabilization, or Growth: A Comparison of Fiscal Policy Objectives

Business Cycles and Macroeconomic Stability: Should We Rebuild Built-In Stabilizers?

Posted: 12 Jan 1998

See all articles by Steven P. Cassou

Steven P. Cassou

Kansas State University - Department of Economics

Kevin J. Lansing

Federal Reserve Banks - Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco

Abstract

This paper investigates a variety of objectives that are commonly used to motivate government fiscal action. These include welfare maximization, stabilization and growth maximization. The policies are compared on the basis of their implications for welfare, volatility and growth. We show that stabilization policies can produce welfare levels that are nearly identical to those of welfare maximization policies and that both welfare maximization and stabilization policies yield large welfare gains and modest growth losses relative to growth maximization policies. We also show that there are side issues to stabilization polices. In particular: 1) It is not possible to stabilize all macroeconomic variables simultaneously, even when the number of policy instruments is equal to the number of shocks; 2) stabilizing a particular variable requires increased volatility of some other variable; 3) stabilization requires some flexibility regarding the government's budget constraint; and 4) stabilization requires the government to respond in a precise and immediate way to exogenous shocks which hit the economy.

JEL Classification: E32, E62, O41

Suggested Citation

Cassou, Steven P. and Lansing, Kevin J., Welfare, Stabilization, or Growth: A Comparison of Fiscal Policy Objectives. Business Cycles and Macroeconomic Stability: Should We Rebuild Built-In Stabilizers?, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=42261

Steven P. Cassou (Contact Author)

Kansas State University - Department of Economics ( email )

Manhattan, KS 66502-4001
United States
785-532-6342 (Phone)
785-532-6919 (Fax)

Kevin J. Lansing

Federal Reserve Banks - Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco ( email )

101 Market Street
PO Box 7702
San Francisco, CA 94105
United States
415-974-2393 (Phone)
415-977-4031 (Fax)

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