Disciplining CBDCs: Addressing the Privacy Aspects and Central Bank Independence

56 Pages Posted: 24 Oct 2022 Last revised: 7 Dec 2023

See all articles by Cheng-Yun (CY) Tsang

Cheng-Yun (CY) Tsang

Monash University - Faculty of Law

Alex Yueh-Ping Yang

National Taiwan University - College of Law

Ping-Kuei Chen

Department of Diplomacy, National Chengchi University

Date Written: October 20, 2022

Abstract

Central bank digital currency (“CBDC”) is a crucial FinTech development that aspires to overhaul the current payment system. In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, CBDCs' promises to reduce personal contact, facilitate socially desirable use of money, and initiate more targeted monetary measures have increased their popularity. In addition, CBDCs can potentially serve as a tool to internationalize a sovereign’s currency. World central banks, thus, have gradually formulated a consensus on structuring CBDCs, leaving the regulatory aspects of CBDCs deserving more attention. Among the regulatory issues related to CBDCs, observers often mentioned their association with privacy concerns, but comprehensive studies on this aspect of CBDCs remain limited.

In this paper, we discuss the privacy concerns associated with CBDCs and attempt to introduce discipline upon CBDCs and their issuing central banks. We first demonstrate the privacy implications of CBDCs and highlight the risks that issuing sovereigns misuse CBDCs to serve their agendas. We then discuss, in a domestic context, several architectural designs proclaimed to address CBDCs’ privacy concerns and propose further disciplinary mechanisms that may credibly enforce privacy protection laws against issuing central banks and other governmental authorities. We finally highlight the extraterritorial character of modern privacy laws, which allows foreign privacy protection regulators to discipline the CBDCs of other sovereigns. Through this analysis, we argue that applying modern privacy laws with proper supporting mechanisms may effectively discipline CBDCs and their issuing central banks.

Keywords: CBDC, privacy protection, privacy law, extraterritoriality, programmable money, Brussel Effect

Suggested Citation

Tsang, Cheng-Yun (CY) and Yang, Alex Yueh-Ping and Chen, Ping-Kuei, Disciplining CBDCs: Addressing the Privacy Aspects and Central Bank Independence (October 20, 2022). Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business, Vol. 43, No. 3, 235-289 (2023), Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4253888 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4253888

Cheng-Yun (CY) Tsang (Contact Author)

Monash University - Faculty of Law ( email )

Melbourne
Australia

Alex Yueh-Ping Yang

National Taiwan University - College of Law ( email )

No.1, Sec.4, Roosevelt Road
Taipei, 10617
Taiwan

Ping-Kuei Chen

Department of Diplomacy, National Chengchi University ( email )

64 Zhinan Rd. Wenshan Dist.
Taipei, 116
Taiwan

HOME PAGE: http://pkchen.weebly.com/

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