Information Revelation in Auctions

NYU, C.V. Starr Center Working Paper No. 03-02

28 Pages Posted: 28 Jul 2003

See all articles by Jean-Pierre Benoit

Jean-Pierre Benoit

London Business School - Department of Economics

Juan Dubra

University of Montevideo - Department of Economics

Date Written: February 2003

Abstract

Auction theory has emphasized the importance of private information to the profits of bidders. However, the theory has failed to consider the question of whether or not bidders will be able to keep their information private. We show that in a variety of contexts bidders will reveal all their information, even if this information revelation is (ex ante) detrimental to them. Similarly, a seller may reveal all her information even when this revelation lowers revenues. We also show that bidders may be harmed by private information.

JEL Classification: C7, D44

Suggested Citation

Benoit, Jean-Pierre and Dubra, Juan, Information Revelation in Auctions (February 2003). NYU, C.V. Starr Center Working Paper No. 03-02, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=426780 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.426780

Jean-Pierre Benoit

London Business School - Department of Economics ( email )

Sussex Place
Regent's Park
London NW1 4SA
United Kingdom

Juan Dubra (Contact Author)

University of Montevideo - Department of Economics ( email )

Prudencio de Pena 2440
Montevideo, CP 11600
Uruguay
5982 707 4461 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http:\\www2.um.edu.uy\dubraj

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