A Spatial Voting Model Where Proportional Rule Leads to Two-Party Equilibria

26 Pages Posted: 1 Aug 2003

See all articles by Francesco De Sinopoli

Francesco De Sinopoli

University of Verona - Department of Economics

Giovanna Iannantuoni

Charles III University of Madrid - Department of Economics; Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca - Center for Interdisciplinary Studies in Economics, Psychology & Social Sciences (CISEPS); Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca - Department of Economics, Management and Statistics (DEMS)

Date Written: August 2003

Abstract

In this paper we show that in a simple spatial model where the government is chosen under strict proportional rule, if the outcome function is a linear combination of parties' positions, with coefficient equal to their share of votes, essentially only a two-party equilibrium exists. The two parties taking a positive number of votes are the two extremist ones. Applications of this result include an extension of the well-known Alesina and Rosenthal model of divided government as well as a modified version of Besley and Coate's model of representative democracy. Different outcome functions are then analyzed.

Keywords: Voting, Proportional Rule, Nash Equilibria

JEL Classification: C72, D72

Suggested Citation

De Sinopoli, Francesco and Iannantuoni, Giovanna, A Spatial Voting Model Where Proportional Rule Leads to Two-Party Equilibria (August 2003). CEIS Tor Vergata - Research Paper Series No. 31, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=428580 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.428580

Francesco De Sinopoli (Contact Author)

University of Verona - Department of Economics ( email )

Via dell'Artigliere, 8
37129 Verona
Italy

Giovanna Iannantuoni

Charles III University of Madrid - Department of Economics ( email )

Calle Madrid 126
Getafe, 28903
Spain

Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca - Center for Interdisciplinary Studies in Economics, Psychology & Social Sciences (CISEPS) ( email )

Piazza dell'Ateneo Nuovo, 1
Milano, 20126
Italy

Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca - Department of Economics, Management and Statistics (DEMS) ( email )

Piazza dell'Ateneo Nuovo, 1
Milan, 20126
Italy

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