Politics, Structure of Protection, and Welfare

REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS

Posted: 25 Oct 1996

See all articles by Y. Stephen Chiu

Y. Stephen Chiu

The University of Hong Kong - School of Economics and Finance

Abstract

Three issues in the political economy of protection are examined. The first, the endogenization of interest group formation, is addressed from the perspective of profitability instead of the difficulty caused by the free rider problem. The second issue is the determinants of an interest group's political influence. Two sets of determinants--the characteristics of the interest group and the political economic environment faced by that group--are identified. The third is the circumstances under which the presence of more interest groups is socially preferable to fewer. We relate such circumstances to the parameters of the model.

JEL Classification: F13

Suggested Citation

Chiu, Yiu Wah Stephen, Politics, Structure of Protection, and Welfare. REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4364

Yiu Wah Stephen Chiu (Contact Author)

The University of Hong Kong - School of Economics and Finance ( email )

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