Values for Strategic Games in Which Players Cooperate
University of Oregon Economics Working Paper No. 2003-5
33 Pages Posted: 18 Oct 2003
Date Written: February 27, 2003
Abstract
In this paper we propose a new method to associate a coalitional game with each strategic game. The method is based on the lower value of matrix games. We axiomatically characterize this new method, as well as the method that was described in von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944). As an intermediate step, we provide some axiomatic characterizations of the value and the lower value of matrix games.
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Carpente, Luisa and García-Jurado, Ignacio and Casas-Mendez, Balbina and van den Nouweland, Anne, Values for Strategic Games in Which Players Cooperate (February 27, 2003). University of Oregon Economics Working Paper No. 2003-5, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=436546 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.436546
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