Values for Strategic Games in Which Players Cooperate

University of Oregon Economics Working Paper No. 2003-5

33 Pages Posted: 18 Oct 2003

See all articles by Luisa Carpente

Luisa Carpente

Universidade da Coruna - Departamento de Matematicas

I. García-Jurado

University of Santiago de Compostela

Balbina Casas-Mendez

Universidade de Santiago de Compostela - Facultade de Matematicas

Anne van den Nouweland

University of Oregon - Department of Economics

Date Written: February 27, 2003

Abstract

In this paper we propose a new method to associate a coalitional game with each strategic game. The method is based on the lower value of matrix games. We axiomatically characterize this new method, as well as the method that was described in von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944). As an intermediate step, we provide some axiomatic characterizations of the value and the lower value of matrix games.

Suggested Citation

Carpente, Luisa and García-Jurado, Ignacio and Casas-Mendez, Balbina and van den Nouweland, Anne, Values for Strategic Games in Which Players Cooperate (February 27, 2003). University of Oregon Economics Working Paper No. 2003-5, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=436546 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.436546

Luisa Carpente

Universidade da Coruna - Departamento de Matematicas

15071 A Coruna
Spain

Ignacio García-Jurado

University of Santiago de Compostela ( email )

15706, Santiago de Compostela
Spain

Balbina Casas-Mendez

Universidade de Santiago de Compostela - Facultade de Matematicas

15782 Santiago de Compostela
Spain

Anne Van den Nouweland (Contact Author)

University of Oregon - Department of Economics ( email )

Eugene, OR 97403
United States
541-346-1267 (Phone)
541-346-1243 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/view/annevandennouweland/

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