Foreign Aid Designed to Diminish Terrorist Atrocities Can Increase Them

45 Pages Posted: 24 Sep 2003

See all articles by Michael Mandler

Michael Mandler

University of London, Royal Holloway College - Department of Economics

Michael Spagat

University of London - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Date Written: August 2003

Abstract

A domestic power faces an enemy and commits terrorist atrocities to increase the likelihood of victory. A foreign patron can grant aid to the power but prefers fewer or no atrocities. The domestic power responds by acquiescing in the creation of uncontrollable paramilitaries that commit even more atrocities. Once the paramilitaries are set up, aid flows and the atrocity level is high. Now suppose the foreign patron is uncertain whether the domestic power can control the paramilitaries. At a pooling equilibrium the home government will commit more atrocities than it would commit in isolation to demonstrate to the foreign patron that the paramilitaries are beyond the domestic power's control. Case studies of Colombia, Northern Ireland, and the Middle East illustrate the models.

Keywords: Civil conflict, foreign aid, paramilitaries, terrorist atrocities, human rights, signalling

JEL Classification: D74, D82

Suggested Citation

Mandler, Michael and Spagat, Michael, Foreign Aid Designed to Diminish Terrorist Atrocities Can Increase Them (August 2003). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=445761

Michael Mandler

University of London, Royal Holloway College - Department of Economics ( email )

Royal Holloway College
University of London
Egham, Surrey TW20 0EX
United Kingdom
+44 1784 443985 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://personal.rhul.ac.uk/uhte/035/

Michael Spagat (Contact Author)

University of London - Department of Economics ( email )

Royal Holloway College
Egham
Surrey, Surrey TW20 0EX
United Kingdom
+44 1784 414 001 (Phone)
+44 1784 439 534 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

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