Institutional Design and Public Policy. A Microeconomic Perspective
Revista de Economia Institucional, Vol. 1, July-December, 1999
44 Pages Posted: 22 Nov 2003
Abstract
This survey article provides a microeconomic perspective of institutional design and public policy, focusing on the way the relations between voters, politicians and bureaucrats produce efficients outcomes in public policy. It points out the relevance of information and monitoring costs, competition and the structural features of institutions in the search of efficient results, and the way social scientists explain the failures of the political and burocratic markets.
Note: Downloadable paper is in Spanish.
Keywords: institucional design, public policy, information costs, political markets, bureaucracy, public choice
JEL Classification: D72, D73, D89
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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