Asymmetries in Policy between Exportables and Import-Competing Goods
29 Pages Posted: 4 Apr 2004 Last revised: 10 Dec 2022
Date Written: March 1989
Abstract
This paper reexamines current understanding of the political economy of protection. To date, work has centered on determinants of the height of protection and its form - tariffs, quantitative restrictions, and voluntary export restraints. It is argued that examining the structure of protection misses one important piece of evidence - why import-competing industries tend to be more highly protected than industries producing exportables. When the question is cast in this light, a number of new insights emerge, including the importance of earlier protective measures in influencing current protectionist pressures. "Identity bias", whereby political decisions can be asymmetric between winners and losers, depending on whose identity is known, is introduced.
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?
Recommended Papers
-
Major Trade Trends in East Asia: What are Their Implications for Regional Cooperation and Growth?
By Francis Ng and Alexander J. Yeats
-
Multilateralising Regionalism: Spaghetti Bowls as Building Blocs on the Path to Global Free Trade
-
Multilateralising Regionalism: Spaghetti Bowls as Building Blocs on the Path to Global Free Trade
-
The Political Economy of Declining Industries: Senescent Industry Collapse Revisited
By S. Lael Brainard and Thierry Verdier
-
Managing the Noodle Bowl: The Fragility of East Asian Regionalism
-
The Formation of International Production and Distribution Networks in East Asia
By Mitsuyo Ando and Fukunari Kimura