Trade and Protection in Vertically Related Markets

36 Pages Posted: 8 Jan 2008 Last revised: 10 Oct 2022

See all articles by Barbara J. Spencer

Barbara J. Spencer

University of British Columbia (UBC) - Sauder School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Ronald W. Jones

University of Rochester - Department of Economics

Date Written: June 1989

Abstract

A domestic firm is partially dependent on a foreign vertically integrated supplier for a key intermediate product when both firms are Cournot competitors in the market for the final product. The foreign supplier generally charges its domestic rival a price for the input that exceeds the independent monopoly level and vertical foreclosure may occur. Domestic policies applied to the vertically related products can increase domestic welfare by reducing the price and increasing the availability of imported supplies of the input. Vertical integration in the foreign supplier has significant implications for all three domestic policies considered: a tariff or subsidy on imports of both products and a domestic production subsidy. The foreign vertically integrated firm tends to reduce its price for the input in response to an import tariff on the final product, whereas a simple monopoly supplier would respond by increasing its export price. Also domestic cost conditions for the production of the input can critically affect the desirability of a tax as apposed to a subsidy on intermediate imports.

Suggested Citation

Spencer, Barbara J. and Jones, Ronald W., Trade and Protection in Vertically Related Markets (June 1989). NBER Working Paper No. w3023, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=463465

Barbara J. Spencer (Contact Author)

University of British Columbia (UBC) - Sauder School of Business ( email )

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Ronald W. Jones

University of Rochester - Department of Economics ( email )

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