Self Enforcing Voting in International Organizations

41 Pages Posted: 17 Nov 2003 Last revised: 10 Aug 2022

See all articles by Giovanni Maggi

Giovanni Maggi

Yale University; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Yale University - Cowles Foundation

Massimo Morelli

Bocconi University

Date Written: November 2003

Abstract

Some international organizations are governed by unanimity rule, some others by a majority system. Still others have moved from one system to the other over time. The existing voting models, which generally assume that decisions made by voting are perfectly enforceable, have a difficult time explaining the observed variation in governance mode, and in particular the widespread occurrence of the unanimity system. We present a model whose main departure from standard voting models is that there is no external enforcement mechanism: each country is sovereign and cannot be forced to follow the collective decision, or in other words, the voting system must be self-enforcing. The model yields unanimity as the optimal system for a wide range of parameters, and delivers rich predictions on the variation in the mode of governance, both across organizations and over time.

Suggested Citation

Maggi, Giovanni and Morelli, Massimo, Self Enforcing Voting in International Organizations (November 2003). NBER Working Paper No. w10102, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=468789

Giovanni Maggi (Contact Author)

Yale University ( email )

New Haven, CT 06511
United States
203-432-3569 (Phone)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Yale University - Cowles Foundation

Box 208281
New Haven, CT 06520-8281
United States

Massimo Morelli

Bocconi University ( email )

Via Roentgen 1
Milan, 20136
Italy

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