Do CEOS in Mergers Trade Power for Premium? Evidence from 'Mergers of Equals'

51 Pages Posted: 17 Nov 2003

Abstract

I analyze CEO incentives to negotiate shared control in the post-merger governance of the surviving firm. In order to do this, I study abnormal returns in a sample of mergers of equals transactions in which the two firms are approximately equal in post-merger board representation. These transactions are friendly mergers generally characterized by pre-merger negotiations that result in both greater shared control (board and management) and more equal sharing of merger gains between the two firms. On average, the value created measured by combined event returns is no different between mergers of equals and a matched sample of transactions. However, target shareholders capture less of the gains measured by event returns in transactions with shared governance. Moreover, target shareholders' share of the gains is systematically related to variables representing post-merger control rights and shared governance is more likely in transactions in which CEOs face greater incentives for control. The evidence suggests that CEOs trade power for premium by negotiating shared control in the merged firm in exchange for lower shareholder premiums.

Suggested Citation

Wulf, Julie M., Do CEOS in Mergers Trade Power for Premium? Evidence from 'Mergers of Equals'. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp. 60-101, Spring 2004, U of Penn, Inst for Law & Econ Research Paper No. 04-04, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=469881

Julie M. Wulf (Contact Author)

Harvard Business School ( email )

Harvard Business School
Boston, MA
United States

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