Performance, Seniority and Wages: Formal Salary Systems and Individual Earnings Profiles
35 Pages Posted: 9 Dec 2003
Date Written: November 2003
Abstract
This paper replicates studies by Medoff and Abraham (1980, 1981) and Flabbi and Ichino (2001) using personnel data from the Dutch national aircraft manufacturer Fokker. It shows how a formal salary system, as is widely used by large firms, brings about that seniority-wage profiles are largely independent of controls for reported performance in cross-sectional wage regressions even though supervisors' evaluations shape life-cycle earnings profiles. Performance ratings determine how fast a worker climbs the firm's career and wage ladder. The paper also reveals that real wage growth depends on the employer's prosperity. Furthermore it demonstrates that formal salary systems cause serial correlation in wage growth and 'Green Card' effects.
Keywords: formal salary systems, returns to seniority, internal labor markets, personnel economics
JEL Classification: M52, J30, J31
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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