Competition Law in Post-Central Planning Bulgaria

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 1723

Posted: 16 Jan 1998

See all articles by Bernard Hoekman

Bernard Hoekman

European University Institute - Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Economic Research Forum (ERF)

Simeon Djankov

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE); Peterson Institute for International Economics

Date Written: November 1997

Abstract

This paper investigates the activities of the Bulgarian competition office, the Commission for the Protection of Competition, during 1991-5. Descriptive statistics are provided on the industry incidence of investigations, the types of behaviour that were investigated, and the frequency with which violations were found and penalties imposed. Although the Commission has attempted to concentrate its efforts in non-tradable sectors and target both cartel and abuse of dominance cases, the remedies that are imposed appear rather ineffective. Moreover, instead of hard core anti-competitive behaviour, much of the Commission's activities have centred on 'unfair' competition (e.g. false advertising, trademark infringement, and the behaviour of ex-employees of specific enterprises). Recently proposed amendments to the law should go some way towards allowing the Commission to focus more narrowly on anti-competitive practices and to strengthen the deterrent effect of the law.

JEL Classification: K21, L40

Suggested Citation

Hoekman, Bernard and Djankov, Simeon, Competition Law in Post-Central Planning Bulgaria (November 1997). CEPR Discussion Paper No. 1723, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=50327

Bernard Hoekman (Contact Author)

European University Institute - Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS) ( email )

via Boccaccio 121
Florence, Florence 50133
Italy

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Economic Research Forum (ERF) ( email )

21 Al-Sad Al-Aaly St.
(P.O. Box: 12311)
Dokki, Cairo
Egypt

Simeon Djankov

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) ( email )

Houghton Street
London, WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom

Peterson Institute for International Economics ( email )

1750 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20036
United States

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