Some Economic Consequences of India's Institutions of Governance: A Conceptual Framework

UC Santa Cruz Economics Working Paper No. 556; SCCIE Working Paper No. 03-20

38 Pages Posted: 23 Mar 2004

See all articles by Nirvikar Singh

Nirvikar Singh

University of California, Santa Cruz

Date Written: December 2003

Abstract

This paper examines the functioning of some of India's institutions of governance, namely, the legislative and executive branches of government, the judiciary, and the bureaucracy, from an instrumental, economic perspective. Governance is analyzed along three dimensions: (1) the degree of commitment or durability of laws and rules, (2) the degree of enforcement of these laws, and (3) the degree of decentralization of jurisdictions with respect to local public goods. It is suggested that India's experience of governance reflects insufficiencies in all three dimensions: of durability, enforcement, and decentralization, with adverse consequences for economic efficiency. The paper concludes with a brief normative discussion of collective action in general, and alternative structures of institutions of governance.

Keywords: governance, commitment, durability, enforcement, decentralization

JEL Classification: H11, K00

Suggested Citation

Singh, Nirvikar, Some Economic Consequences of India's Institutions of Governance: A Conceptual Framework (December 2003). UC Santa Cruz Economics Working Paper No. 556; SCCIE Working Paper No. 03-20, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=508662 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.508662

Nirvikar Singh (Contact Author)

University of California, Santa Cruz ( email )

Department of Economics
E2 Building
Santa Cruz, CA 95064
United States
831-459-4093 (Phone)
831-459-5077 (Fax)

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