Referendum Timing

21 Pages Posted: 7 May 2004

See all articles by Mattias Polborn

Mattias Polborn

Vanderbilt University - College of Arts and Science - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Gerald Willmann

Bielefeld University; IfW Kiel; KU Leuven; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Date Written: May 7, 2004

Abstract

In many important political problems, citizens can directly participate in the political decision making through a referendum. These settings are often characterized by uncertainty over the future consequences of the decision, the possibility of learning about these over time, and the irreversibility of the decision once it has been made.

In our model, a politician who may be biased (relative to the median voter) chooses the timing of the referendum. We analyze how the optimal timing decision depends on the political environment and the bias of the politician. We show that the power to schedule a referendum allows both positively and negatively biased politicians to implement decisions different from those preferred by the median voter.

Keywords: Referendum, timing problems, dynamic political economy

JEL Classification: C7, D7

Suggested Citation

Polborn, Mattias K. and Willmann, Gerald, Referendum Timing (May 7, 2004). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=527548 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.527548

Mattias K. Polborn (Contact Author)

Vanderbilt University - College of Arts and Science - Department of Economics ( email )

Box 1819 Station B
Nashville, TN 37235
United States

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Gerald Willmann

Bielefeld University ( email )

Universitätsstraße 25
Bielefeld, NRW 33613
Germany

IfW Kiel ( email )

P.O. Box 4309
Kiel, Schleswig-Hosltein D-24100
Germany

KU Leuven ( email )

Oude Markt 13
Leuven, Vlaams-Brabant 3000
Belgium

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

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