Citizen-Candidate Mobility and Endogenous Local Policy
Posted: 8 Jun 2004
Abstract
In this paper we analyze the influence of personal mobility on the citizens' willingness to run for a political office in their municipality and on the resulting local policy outcome. Our model portrays heterogeneous policy preferences that are coupled with different degrees of interjurisdictional mobility. We show that an increase in mobility can be liable to shift the policy outcome towards the preferred policy of the less mobile citizens. We thus identify an endogenous policy response to personal mobility diametrically opposed to the tax competition effect that has hitherto dominated the discussion of the political consequences of personal mobility.
Keywords: Interjurisdictional Mobility, Political Economy, Participation, Citizen-Candidates
JEL Classification: D72, H70, J61
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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