The Political Economy of Social Security: A Survey

Posted: 11 Jun 2004

See all articles by Vincenzo Galasso

Vincenzo Galasso

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Bocconi University; University of Bocconi - Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research (IGIER); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); Bocconi University - Baffi Carefin Centre

Paola Profeta

Bocconi University - Department of Policy Analysis and Public Management; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Abstract

This paper surveys the literature on the political economy of social security. We review models that address the following questions: (i) Why do social security programs that transfer resources from young and middle-aged workers to the elderly exist? (ii) What are the economic and political interactions between social security systems and other redistributive programs of the welfare state? (iii) How does political sustainability shape social security systems in a dynamic economic and demographic environment, and which social security reforms are politically feasible? We characterize this literature along two lines: economic factors and political institutions. We then assess the empirical relevance of the models by comparing their implications to stylized social security facts.

Keywords: Redistribution, multidimensional voting, political pressure, political sustainability, social security reforms

JEL Classification: H53, H55, D72

Suggested Citation

Galasso, Vincenzo and Galasso, Vincenzo and Profeta, Paola, The Political Economy of Social Security: A Survey. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=555927

Vincenzo Galasso (Contact Author)

Bocconi University ( email )

Via Roetgen 1
20136 Milan, MI 20136
Italy

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

University of Bocconi - Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research (IGIER)

Via Roentgen 1
Milan, 20136
Italy
+39 02 5836 5319 (Phone)
+39 02 5836 5318 (Fax)

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Bocconi University - Baffi Carefin Centre ( email )

Via Roentgen 1
Milan
Italy

Paola Profeta

Bocconi University - Department of Policy Analysis and Public Management ( email )

Via Roentgen 1
Milan, 20136
Italy

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
1,404
PlumX Metrics