A Composite Run-to-The-Bank Rule for Multi-Issue Allocation Situations

CentER Discussion Paper No. 2003-59

15 Pages Posted: 23 Jul 2004

See all articles by Carlos M. Gonzalez-Alcon

Carlos M. Gonzalez-Alcon

Universidad de La Laguna

Peter Borm

Tilburg University - Center for Economic Research (CentER); Tilburg University - Department of Econometrics & Operations Research

Ruud Hendrickx

Tilburg University - Center for Economic Research (CentER)

Date Written: 2003

Abstract

In this paper, we propose a new extension of the run-to-the-bank rule for bankruptcy situations to the class of multi-issue allocation situations. We show that this rule always yields a core element and that it satisfies self-duality. We characterize our rule by means of a new consistency property, issue-consistency.

Keywords: Cooperative games, multi-issue allocation, bankruptcy, self-duality, consistency

Suggested Citation

Gonzalez-Alcon, Carlos María and Borm, Peter E. M. and Hendrickx, Ruud, A Composite Run-to-The-Bank Rule for Multi-Issue Allocation Situations (2003). CentER Discussion Paper No. 2003-59, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=556078 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.556078

Carlos María Gonzalez-Alcon (Contact Author)

Universidad de La Laguna ( email )

Departamento de Matemáticas, Estadística e I.O.
Apartado 456
La Laguna, Santa Cruz de Tenerife 38200
Spain

Peter E. M. Borm

Tilburg University - Center for Economic Research (CentER) ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

Tilburg University - Department of Econometrics & Operations Research

Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

Ruud Hendrickx

Tilburg University - Center for Economic Research (CentER) ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands