Stochastic Evolution of Rules for Playing Normal Form Games

Germano, Fabrizio

doi:10.2139/ssrn.563851

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Stochastic Evolution of Rules for Playing Normal Form Games

UPF Economics and Business Working Paper No. 761

24 Pages Posted: 12 Jul 2004

See all articles by Fabrizio Germano

Fabrizio Germano

Universitat Pompeu Fabra - Department of Economics and Business

Date Written: June 2004

Abstract

The evolution of boundedly rational rules for playing normal form games is studied within stationary environments of stochastically changing games. Rules are viewed as algorithms prescribing strategies for the different normal form games that arise. It is shown that many of the folk results of evolutionary game theory typically obtained with a fixed game and fixed strategies carry over to the present case. The results are also related to recent experiments on rules and games.

Keywords: Rules, evolutionary dynamics, stochastic dynamics, bounded rationality, learning, normal form games

JEL Classification: C72, C73, D81, D83

Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation

Germano, Fabrizio, Stochastic Evolution of Rules for Playing Normal Form Games (June 2004). UPF Economics and Business Working Paper No. 761, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=563851 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.563851