Financial Sector Adjustment Lending: A Mid-Course Analysis

85 Pages Posted: 20 Apr 2016

See all articles by Robert Cull

Robert Cull

World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG)

Date Written: August 1997

Abstract

Given a minimum acceptable level of macroeconomic stability, post-intervention financial deepening can be associated with either favorable initial conditions or successful institutional strengthening, or both, although the most deepening has occurred where initial conditions were good.

Nearly 100 countries have experienced bank insolvencies in the past 20 years. Weakness in the financial sectors of many countries is reflected in the size of the insolvencies - many cases, the cost of bailout exceeded 15 percent of GDP - the fact that these crises often recur. Because a strong financial sector is important for economic growth, the World Bank has increasingly granted loans with conditions attached to achieve specific financial sector reforms.

The Bank often employs financial sector adjustment loans (FSALs) or, in poorer countries, credits (FSACs). FSALs are generally more comprehensive than other types of interventions and tend to concentrate on the reform areas most closely linked to the operations of deposit banks. Since 1990, their main focus has shifted from improving prudential regulations and correcting interest rate distortions to privatizing and recapitalizing banks.

Cull examines whether (1) initial conditions in a recipient country explain a substantial amount of the variation in intervention outcomes (as measured by post-intervention financial deepening) and (2) whether the changing nature of interventions has had implications for their success. He finds that:

- The decline in post-intervention performance since 1990 cannot be attributed solely to initial macroeconomic and financial sector conditions in the recipient country. - When initial macroeconomic and financial sector conditions were controlled for, certain types of reform, especially those dealing with prudential regulations, were associated with relatively large increases in the ratio of money supply (M2) to GDP. Those dealing with recapitalization have also been relatively successful, especially when they also tackled prudential regulation or banking supervision. Those that focused on supervision did not, on average, substantially outperform those that did not focus on supervision. And reform focused on bank privatization was associated with much less financial deepening three years after the intervention. - In addition to reform aimed at institutional strengthening, the reform environment itself had a substantial impact on intervention outcomes. Financial deepening was positively associated with macroeconomic stability (low inflation) and an initially underdeveloped financial sector. - As the Bank's operational directives suggest, some macroeconomic stability is important for the success of financial sector interventions, especially those that incorporate interest rate liberalization. While it may be best to move more aggressively on financial reform when macroeconomic circumstances are favorable, visible reform (such as privatization or interest rate deregulation) should be slowed rather than abandoned in less fortunate circumstances. By contrast, less visible institution-building efforts should be continued regardless of macroeconomic conditions.

This paper - a product of the Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to evaluate the effectiveness of World Bank lending.

Suggested Citation

Cull, Robert, Financial Sector Adjustment Lending: A Mid-Course Analysis (August 1997). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=569246

Robert Cull (Contact Author)

World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG) ( email )

1818 H. Street, N.W.
MSN3-311
Washington, DC 20433
United States
202-473-6365 (Phone)
202-522-1155 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://econ.worldbank.org/staff/rcull

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
95
Abstract Views
1,218
Rank
495,746
PlumX Metrics