Strategic Manipulations of Multi-Valued Solutions in Economies with Indivisibilities

Posted: 30 Jul 2004

Date Written: July 2004

Abstract

We study manipulability of multi-valued solutions in fair allocation of homogeneous indivisible objects with monetary transfers. We show that the no-envy solution satisfies some extension of strategy-proofness to multi-valued solutions. Since no-envy implies Pareto efficiency in this literature, this result implies that we can escape many impossibility results on strategy-proofness by allowing a solution to be multi-valued and extending strategy-proofness in an appropriate way. Nevertheless, we show that no-envy is not immune to all forms of manipulations. In that sense, we are able to identify what kind of manipulations occur. Next, we derive impossibility results on the egalitarian-equivalence and efficient solution. The intuition that manipulability comes from single-valuedness is not confirmed by this solution. Finally, we show that there is no subsolution of the Pareto and identical preferences lower bound satisfying the notion of extended strategy-proofness used by Tadenuma-Thomson (1995).

Keywords: Indivisible goods, Extended strategy-proofness, No-envy, Egalitarian equivalence, Identical preferences lower bound, Fair allocations

Suggested Citation

Bochet, Olivier, Strategic Manipulations of Multi-Valued Solutions in Economies with Indivisibilities (July 2004). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=570066

Olivier Bochet (Contact Author)

New York University Abu Dhabi ( email )

PO Box 129188
Abu Dhabi
United Arab Emirates

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/obochet2/

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