Do You a Favor? Social Implications of High Aspirations in Negotiation

33 Pages Posted: 22 Aug 2004

See all articles by Hannah Riley Bowles

Hannah Riley Bowles

Harvard University - Harvard Kennedy School (HKS)

Linda Babcock

Carnegie Mellon University - H. John Heinz III School of Public Policy and Management

Lei Lai

Carnegie Mellon University - H. John Heinz III School of Public Policy and Management

Date Written: July 15, 2004

Abstract

Study explores implications of high aspirations for potential future cooperation with one's negotiating counterpart. Participants were 134 undergraduate students acting as buyers or sellers in a price negotiation. Buyers were assigned more or less ambitious aspirations. Buyers with more ambitious aspirations negotiated a greater percentage of the surplus. Sellers paired with buyers with more ambitious aspirations were less satisfied with the negotiation outcome, found their negotiating counterparts to be less likeable, expressed less willingness to work with or do a favor for their negotiating counterparts, and were less generous toward their counterparts when allocating money in a post-negotiation decision exercise. Likeability of the buyer mediated the effect of buyer aspiration level on sellers' satisfaction and willingness to cooperate in future.

Keywords: Aspirations, negotiation, social behavior

Suggested Citation

Bowles, Hannah Riley and Babcock, Linda C. and Lai, Lei, Do You a Favor? Social Implications of High Aspirations in Negotiation (July 15, 2004). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=573581 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.573581

Hannah Riley Bowles (Contact Author)

Harvard University - Harvard Kennedy School (HKS) ( email )

79 John F. Kennedy Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-496-4717 (Phone)
617-496-2850 (Fax)

Linda C. Babcock

Carnegie Mellon University - H. John Heinz III School of Public Policy and Management ( email )

Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890
United States
412-268-8789 (Phone)
412-268-7036 (Fax)

Lei Lai

Carnegie Mellon University - H. John Heinz III School of Public Policy and Management ( email )

Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890
United States

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