Asymmetric Information and the Demand for Health Care - the Case of Double Moral Hazard
University of Bayreuth Economics Discussion Paper No. 02-03
24 Pages Posted: 27 Sep 2004
Date Written: April 2003
Abstract
The production of health does not only depend on the medical services supplied by the physician but is also influenced by the patient's compliance. A model of medical treatment is presented in which both the actions of physician and patient are modeled as a productive input. The analysis distinguishes between three cases of strategic interaction. The consequences of asymmetric information between physician and patient are lower activity levels, only in the case of strategic substitutes the result might change. Furthermore, the effects of the implementation of a demand-side coinsurance are discussed.
Keywords: Principal-agent theory, double moral hazard, strategic interaction, compliance
JEL Classification: I11, D82
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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