The Rise and Fall of the Widely Held Firm - a History of Corporate Ownership in Canada

54 Pages Posted: 23 Aug 2004 Last revised: 23 Jan 2022

See all articles by Randall Morck

Randall Morck

University of Alberta - Department of Finance and Statistical Analysis; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Asian Bureau of Finance and Economic Research

Michael Percy

Independent

Gloria Yuan Tian

University of Lethbridge Calgary Campus; Financial Research Network (FIRN)

Bernard Yin Yeung

National University of Singapore - Business School

Date Written: July 2004

Abstract

A panel of corporate ownership data, stretching back to 1902, shows that the Canadian corporate sector began the century with a predominance of large pyramidal corporate groups controlled by wealthy families or individuals. By mid-century, widely held firms predominated. But, from the 1970s on, pyramidal groups controlled by wealthy families and individuals resurge, restoring a situation similar to that a century earlier. Institutional factors underlying this resurgence are shown to have antecedents deep in the country's colonial past.

Suggested Citation

Morck, Randall K. and Percy, Michael and Tian, Gloria Yuan and Yeung, Bernard Yin, The Rise and Fall of the Widely Held Firm - a History of Corporate Ownership in Canada (July 2004). NBER Working Paper No. w10635, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=579782

Randall K. Morck (Contact Author)

University of Alberta - Department of Finance and Statistical Analysis ( email )

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

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Michael Percy

Independent

Gloria Yuan Tian

University of Lethbridge Calgary Campus ( email )

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Calgary, Alberta T2G 4V1
Canada

Financial Research Network (FIRN)

C/- University of Queensland Business School
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Queensland
Australia

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Bernard Yin Yeung

National University of Singapore - Business School ( email )

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Singapore, 119245
Singapore
65 6516 3075 (Phone)
65 6779 1365 (Fax)

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