Merger Policy and Innovation: Must Enforcement Change to Account for Technological Change?

74 Pages Posted: 14 Sep 2004 Last revised: 8 Oct 2022

See all articles by Michael L. Katz

Michael L. Katz

University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics; Haas School of Business

Howard A. Shelanski

Georgetown University Law Center

Date Written: August 2004

Abstract

Merger policy is the most active area of U.S. antitrust policy. It is now widely believed that merger policy must move beyond its traditional focus on static efficiency to account for innovation and address dynamic efficiency. Innovation can fundamentally affect merger analysis in two ways. First, innovation can dramatically affect the relationship between the pre-merger marketplace and what is likely to happen if a proposed merger is consummated. Thus, innovation can fundamentally influence the appropriate analysis for addressing traditional, static efficiency concerns. Second, innovation can itself be an important dimension of market performance that is potentially affected by a merger. We explore how merger policy is meeting the challenges posed by innovation.

Suggested Citation

Katz, Michael L. and Shelanski, Howard A., Merger Policy and Innovation: Must Enforcement Change to Account for Technological Change? (August 2004). NBER Working Paper No. w10710, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=583708

Michael L. Katz (Contact Author)

University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics ( email )

579 Evans Hall
Berkeley, CA 94709
United States

Haas School of Business ( email )

Berkeley, CA 94720
United States

Howard A. Shelanski

Georgetown University Law Center ( email )

600 New Jersey Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001
United States

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