Evidence on the Strategic Allocation of Initial Public Offerings
Posted: 20 Dec 1998
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Evidence on the Strategic Allocation of Initial Public Offerings
Posted: 20 Dec 1998
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Evidence on the Strategic Allocation of Initial Public Offerings
Journal of Financial Economics (JFE), Vol. 37, No. 2, 1995
Posted: 29 Feb 2008
Abstract
The evidence reported in this paper suggests that institutional investors capture a large fraction of the short-run profits associated with IPOs. The favored status enjoyed by institutional investors in underpriced offerings appears, however, to carry a "quid pro quo" expectation that they will participate in less-attractive issues as well. This finding conforms with the notion that U.S. underwriters behave strategically in the allocation of IPOs.
JEL Classification: G12
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Hanley, Kathleen Weiss and Wilhelm, William J., Evidence on the Strategic Allocation of Initial Public Offerings. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5896
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