Long-Run Selection and the Work Ethic

34 Pages Posted: 24 Sep 2004

See all articles by Jens Josephson

Jens Josephson

Stockholm University; Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)

Karl Warneryd

Stockholm School of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: October 2004

Abstract

That individuals contribute in social dilemma interactions even when contributing is costly is a well-established observation in the experimental literature. Since a contributor is always strictly worse off than a non-contributor the question is raised if an intrinsic motivation to contribute can survive in an evolutionary setting. Using recent results on deterministic approximation of stochastic evolutionary dynamics we give conditions for equilibria with a positive number of contributors to be selected in the long run.

Keywords: Work ethic, evolution, group selection, public goods, stochastic dynamics

JEL Classification: C72, D23, H41, M14, Z13

Suggested Citation

Josephson, Jens and Warneryd, Karl, Long-Run Selection and the Work Ethic (October 2004). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=594866 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.594866

Jens Josephson

Stockholm University ( email )

Sweden

Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN) ( email )

Box 55665
Grevgatan 34, 2nd floor
Stockholm, SE-102 15
Sweden

Karl Warneryd (Contact Author)

Stockholm School of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 6501
S-113 83 Stockholm
Sweden
+46 8 736 9206 (Phone)
+46 8 347 818 (Fax)

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

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