Long-Run Selection and the Work Ethic
34 Pages Posted: 24 Sep 2004
There are 3 versions of this paper
Long-Run Selection and the Work Ethic
Long-Run Selection and the Work Ethic
Long-Run Selection and the Work Ethic
Date Written: October 2004
Abstract
That individuals contribute in social dilemma interactions even when contributing is costly is a well-established observation in the experimental literature. Since a contributor is always strictly worse off than a non-contributor the question is raised if an intrinsic motivation to contribute can survive in an evolutionary setting. Using recent results on deterministic approximation of stochastic evolutionary dynamics we give conditions for equilibria with a positive number of contributors to be selected in the long run.
Keywords: Work ethic, evolution, group selection, public goods, stochastic dynamics
JEL Classification: C72, D23, H41, M14, Z13
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation