Favoritism in the Public Provision of Goods in Developing Countries
Economics Bulletin, Vol. 15, No. 1, pp. 1-10, 2004
Posted: 10 Oct 2004
There are 2 versions of this paper
Favoritism in the Public Provision of Goods in Developing Countries
Abstract
Goods are often allocated publicly by means of queuing processes in developing countries. In such situations, which group of citizens should a corrupt government official favor? In addition, what should be the basis for this favoritism? To the best of our knowledge, these salient questions have received little attention in the literature. Therefore, we use queuing theory to first show that when allocating goods publically, a case can be made for favoring a particular group of citizens. Next, we show that the nature of this favoritism depends not only on the bribes received by the corrupt government official but also on the efficiency with which this official discharges his duties.
Keywords: Favoritism, Bribery, Corruption, Developing Country
JEL Classification: D73, D81, O12
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation