Evaluating Incentive Mechanisms for Conserving Habitat

Posted: 12 Oct 2004

See all articles by Gregory Parkhurst

Gregory Parkhurst

Mississippi State University - Department of Agricultural Economics

Jason F. Shogren

University of Wyoming

Abstract

Private lands have an important role in the success of the Endangered Species Act (ESA). The current command-and-control approach to protecting species on private land has resulted in disincentives to the landowner, which have decreased the ability of the ESA to protect many of our endangered and threatened species. Herein we define and evaluate, from an economic perspective, eight incentive mechanisms, including the status quo, for protecting species on private land. We highlight the strengths and weaknesses and compare and contrast the incentive mechanisms according to a distinct set of biological, landowner, and government criteria. Our discussion indicates that market instruments, such as tradable permits or taxes, which have been successful in controlling air pollution, are not as effective for habitat protection. Alternatively, voluntary incentive mechanisms can be designed such that landowners view habitat as an asset and are willing participants in protecting habitat. The incentive mechanism best suited for conserving habitat in a given region depends on many factors, including government funding, land values, quantity and quality of habitat, and the region's developmental pressure.

Suggested Citation

Parkhurst, Gregory and Shogren, Jason F., Evaluating Incentive Mechanisms for Conserving Habitat. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=601803

Gregory Parkhurst (Contact Author)

Mississippi State University - Department of Agricultural Economics ( email )

Box 5187
Mississippi State, MS 39762
United States
662.325.6879 (Phone)
662.325.8777 (Fax)

Jason F. Shogren

University of Wyoming ( email )

Department of Economics
BU292
Laramie, WY 82071-3985
United States
307-766-5430 (Phone)
307-766-5090 (Fax)

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