Reputation Concerns Limit Misrepresentation in Social Decision Making
32 Pages Posted: 25 Oct 2004
Date Written: February 3, 2004
Abstract
Economic and social psychological models of human behavior suggest that concern with one's reputation limits strategic misrepresentation in social decision making. The authors tested this assumption in 2 experiments. In Exp. 1 (N = 86) participants gave more deceitful information under anonymity than under public scrutiny, no matter whether the public knowledge about their lies had economic consequences or not, which supports the social-psychological rather than the economical model. Exp. 1 (N = 54) showed that the effect of mere observation is moderated by self-monitoring, such that high self-monitors restrained more from lying when being observed than low self-monitors.
Keywords: Reputation, Deception, Strategic Misleading
JEL Classification: D74
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation