Reputation Concerns Limit Misrepresentation in Social Decision Making

32 Pages Posted: 25 Oct 2004

See all articles by Wolfgang Steinel

Wolfgang Steinel

Leiden University - Social and Organizational Psychology

Carsten K. W. De Dreu

University of Amsterdam - Department of Psychology

Date Written: February 3, 2004

Abstract

Economic and social psychological models of human behavior suggest that concern with one's reputation limits strategic misrepresentation in social decision making. The authors tested this assumption in 2 experiments. In Exp. 1 (N = 86) participants gave more deceitful information under anonymity than under public scrutiny, no matter whether the public knowledge about their lies had economic consequences or not, which supports the social-psychological rather than the economical model. Exp. 1 (N = 54) showed that the effect of mere observation is moderated by self-monitoring, such that high self-monitors restrained more from lying when being observed than low self-monitors.

Keywords: Reputation, Deception, Strategic Misleading

JEL Classification: D74

Suggested Citation

Steinel, Wolfgang and De Dreu, Carsten K. W., Reputation Concerns Limit Misrepresentation in Social Decision Making (February 3, 2004). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=609286 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.609286

Wolfgang Steinel (Contact Author)

Leiden University - Social and Organizational Psychology ( email )

Leiden, 2300 RA
Netherlands

Carsten K. W. De Dreu

University of Amsterdam - Department of Psychology ( email )

Roetersstraat 15
Amsterdam, 1018 WB
Netherlands
+31 20 525 6865 (Phone)
+31 20 639 0531 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.psy.uva.nl/ResEdu/AO/People/Dreu/deDreu.html

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