Public Pensions and Immigration Policy When Voters are Differently Skilled

9 Pages Posted: 12 Nov 2004 Last revised: 6 Nov 2008

See all articles by Tim Krieger

Tim Krieger

University of Freiburg - Department of Economics

Date Written: October 1, 2004

Abstract

Although immigration of workers generates a positive externality on members of domestic pension systems, many countries are very reluctant to allow foreigners into their labor markets. In a political economic framework, we explain this voting outcome by considering a young unskilled median voter who faces - in addition to a reduction of contribution rates - negative effects from immigration as well.

Parts of this working paper are published under the title "Public Pensions and Return Migration" (Public Choice 134, 2008, 3-4, 163-178).

Keywords: Pensions, immigration, median voter, skill differences

JEL Classification: H55, J61

Suggested Citation

Krieger, Tim, Public Pensions and Immigration Policy When Voters are Differently Skilled (October 1, 2004). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=617351 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.617351

Tim Krieger (Contact Author)

University of Freiburg - Department of Economics ( email )

University of Freiburg
Wilhelmstr. 1b
Freiburg, D-79085
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.wguth.uni-freiburg.de

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
211
Abstract Views
926
Rank
261,591
PlumX Metrics