Public Pensions and Immigration Policy When Voters are Differently Skilled
9 Pages Posted: 12 Nov 2004 Last revised: 6 Nov 2008
Date Written: October 1, 2004
Abstract
Although immigration of workers generates a positive externality on members of domestic pension systems, many countries are very reluctant to allow foreigners into their labor markets. In a political economic framework, we explain this voting outcome by considering a young unskilled median voter who faces - in addition to a reduction of contribution rates - negative effects from immigration as well.
Parts of this working paper are published under the title "Public Pensions and Return Migration" (Public Choice 134, 2008, 3-4, 163-178).
Keywords: Pensions, immigration, median voter, skill differences
JEL Classification: H55, J61
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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