Endogenous Lobbying, Second Version

41 Pages Posted: 8 Dec 2004

See all articles by Leonardo Felli

Leonardo Felli

University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Antonio Merlo

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics; Rice University

Date Written: July 19, 2004

Abstract

In this paper, we present a citizen-candidate model of representative democracy with endogenous lobbying. We find that lobbying induces policy compromise and always affects equilibrium policy outcomes. In particular, even though the policy preferences of lobbies are relatively extreme, lobbying biases the outcome of the political process toward the center of the policy space, and extreme policies cannot emerge in equilibrium. Moreover, in equilibrium, not all lobbies participate in the policy-making process.

Note: A previous version of this abstract can be found at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=222208

Keywords: Lobbying, citizen-candidate, representative democracy, electoral competition

JEL Classification: D72, D78

Suggested Citation

Felli, Leonardo and Merlo, Antonio M., Endogenous Lobbying, Second Version (July 19, 2004). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=631721 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.631721

Leonardo Felli (Contact Author)

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CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

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Antonio M. Merlo

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics ( email )

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