The Biais-Martimort-Rochet Equilibrium With Direct Mechanisms
23 Pages Posted: 17 Dec 2004 Last revised: 28 Oct 2007
Date Written: September 2007
Abstract
In this note we show that the equilibrium characterized by Biais, Martimort and Rochet (Econometrica, 2000) could have been characterized by direct mechanisms even if the Revelation Principle does not apply in their setting. The use of more sophisticated mechanisms, such as menus, was not necessary.
Keywords: Common Agency, Revelation Principle, Direct Mechanisms, Nonlinear Prices
JEL Classification: D82
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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