Axiomatizations of a Class of Equal Surplus Sharing Solutions for Cooperative Games with Transferable Utility
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. TI 04-136/1
32 Pages Posted: 8 Jan 2005
Date Written: December 2004
Abstract
A situation in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A one-point solution for TU-games assigns a payoff distribution to every TU-game. In this paper, we discuss a class of solutions containing all convex combinations of the CIS-value, the ENSC-value, and the egalitarian solution. We characterize this class of solutions using a general standardness for two player games and reduced game consistency. Specific cases of these properties characterize specific solutions in this class.
Keywords: TU-game, equal surplus sharing, CIS-value, ENSC-value, Egalitarian solution, reduced game consistency
JEL Classification: C71
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation