Axiomatizations of a Class of Equal Surplus Sharing Solutions for Cooperative Games with Transferable Utility

Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. TI 04-136/1

32 Pages Posted: 8 Jan 2005

See all articles by René van den Brink

René van den Brink

VU University Amsterdam - Department of Economics; Tinbergen Institute; Tinbergen Institute

Yukihiko Funaki

Waseda University, School of Political Science and Economics

Date Written: December 2004

Abstract

A situation in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A one-point solution for TU-games assigns a payoff distribution to every TU-game. In this paper, we discuss a class of solutions containing all convex combinations of the CIS-value, the ENSC-value, and the egalitarian solution. We characterize this class of solutions using a general standardness for two player games and reduced game consistency. Specific cases of these properties characterize specific solutions in this class.

Keywords: TU-game, equal surplus sharing, CIS-value, ENSC-value, Egalitarian solution, reduced game consistency

JEL Classification: C71

Suggested Citation

van den Brink, J.R. (René) and Funaki, Yukihiko, Axiomatizations of a Class of Equal Surplus Sharing Solutions for Cooperative Games with Transferable Utility (December 2004). Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. TI 04-136/1, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=644121 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.644121

J.R. (René) Van den Brink (Contact Author)

VU University Amsterdam - Department of Economics ( email )

De Boelelaan 1105
1081 HV Amsterdam
Netherlands

Tinbergen Institute ( email )

Burg. Oudlaan 50
Rotterdam, 3062 PA
Netherlands

Tinbergen Institute ( email )

Burg. Oudlaan 50
Rotterdam, 3062 PA
Netherlands

Yukihiko Funaki

Waseda University, School of Political Science and Economics ( email )

1-6-1 Nishi-Waseda
Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo 169-8050, Tokyo 169-8050
Japan

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