Privileged Interfirm/Bank Relationships in Central Europe: Trigger or Trap for Corporate Governance?
CASE Center for Economic and Social Research Studies and Analyses Working Paper No. 170
32 Pages Posted: 14 Feb 2005
There are 2 versions of this paper
Privileged Interfirm/Bank Relationships in Central Europe: Trigger or Trap for Corporate Governance?
Privileged Interfirm/Bank Relationships in Central Europe: Trigger or Trap for Corporate Governance?
Date Written: 1999
Abstract
The paper focuses on the question whether banks and capital markets in Central Europe are capable of exerting a positive influence on enterprise performance at the present stage of the economic transformation. These markets are characterised by privileged, collaborative interfirm/interbank relationships demonstrated through various channels. Among them is the competition for private deposits between commercial and national banks that are simultaneously supervisors of commercial banks, as is the case in Poland. Other channels include: heavily indebted large banks that are owners of industrial companies (as is the case in Slovakia with the steel mill VSZ owning the third largest bank IRB), investment funds that are facilitating industrial restructuring, and foreign banks holding only minority stakes in large domestic financial institutions.
Keywords: banks, capital market, enterprises, Central Europe, interfirm/bank relationship, corporate governance
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