Privileged Interfirm/Bank Relationships in Central Europe: Trigger or Trap for Corporate Governance?

CASE Center for Economic and Social Research Studies and Analyses Working Paper No. 170

32 Pages Posted: 14 Feb 2005

See all articles by Gerhard Fink

Gerhard Fink

Dept of International Business and Trade

Peter R. Haiss

WU Vienna University of Economics and Business; UniCredit Bank Austria; IES Vienna - Institute for the International Education of Students

Lucjan T. Orlowski

Sacred Heart University - John F. Welch College of Business

Dominick Salvatore

Fordham University - Department of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: 1999

Abstract

The paper focuses on the question whether banks and capital markets in Central Europe are capable of exerting a positive influence on enterprise performance at the present stage of the economic transformation. These markets are characterised by privileged, collaborative interfirm/interbank relationships demonstrated through various channels. Among them is the competition for private deposits between commercial and national banks that are simultaneously supervisors of commercial banks, as is the case in Poland. Other channels include: heavily indebted large banks that are owners of industrial companies (as is the case in Slovakia with the steel mill VSZ owning the third largest bank IRB), investment funds that are facilitating industrial restructuring, and foreign banks holding only minority stakes in large domestic financial institutions.

Keywords: banks, capital market, enterprises, Central Europe, interfirm/bank relationship, corporate governance

Suggested Citation

Fink, Gerhard and Haiss, Peter R. and Orlowski, Lucjan T. and Salvatore, Dominick, Privileged Interfirm/Bank Relationships in Central Europe: Trigger or Trap for Corporate Governance? (1999). CASE Center for Economic and Social Research Studies and Analyses Working Paper No. 170, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=665881 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.665881

Gerhard Fink

Dept of International Business and Trade ( email )

Welthandelsplatz 1, Building D1
Wien, 1020
Austria
+43/1/313364331 (Phone)

Peter R. Haiss

WU Vienna University of Economics and Business ( email )

Institute for Production Management
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Vienna, A-1020
Austria
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UniCredit Bank Austria ( email )

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Austria
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HOME PAGE: http://www.bankaustria.com

IES Vienna - Institute for the International Education of Students

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Vienna, A-1010
Austria

Lucjan T. Orlowski (Contact Author)

Sacred Heart University - John F. Welch College of Business ( email )

5151 Park Avenue
Fairfield, CT 06825
United States
203-371-7858 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.sacredheart.edu/ltorlowski.cfm

Dominick Salvatore

Fordham University - Department of Economics ( email )

Bronx, NY 10458
United States

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