Public Vices, Private Serfdom? Comments on the Optimal Size of the Brazilian State

CEAEE Working Paper No. 2005/01/01

16 Pages Posted: 14 Feb 2005

See all articles by Claudio D. Shikida

Claudio D. Shikida

PPGOM; Ibmec

Ronald Hillbrecht

Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS)

Ari Francisco Araujo Junior

Instituto Brasileiro de Mercado de Capitais (IBMEC)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: 2005

Abstract

In this paper Scully's model (1995) was implemented empirically to determine the optimal size of the public sector in Brazil in terms of "serfdom" days allocated by individuals for the payment of taxes (the so-called tax freedom day). The results indicate that this number would be approximately 118 days per year, which corresponds to a total tax burden of about 32% of GDP. As comparisons between countries are limited by the distinct taxation systems adopted, we seek to explain this result in light of the main hypotheses about government growth in literature.

Keywords: government size, rent-seeking, public choice, tax freedom day

JEL Classification: D72

Suggested Citation

Shikida, Claudio D. and Hillbrecht, Ronald and Araujo Junior, Ari Francisco, Public Vices, Private Serfdom? Comments on the Optimal Size of the Brazilian State (2005). CEAEE Working Paper No. 2005/01/01, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=666521 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.666521

Claudio D. Shikida (Contact Author)

PPGOM ( email )

Rua Gomes Carneiro nº 1
4o andar
Pelotas, Rio Grande do Sul 96001-970
Brazil

Ibmec ( email )

Rua Rio Grande do Norte, 300
Belo Horizonte
Brazil

Ronald Hillbrecht

Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS) ( email )

Av. Carlos Gomes 1111
Porto Alegre, Rio Grande do Sul 90480-004
Brazil

Ari Francisco Araujo Junior

Instituto Brasileiro de Mercado de Capitais (IBMEC) ( email )

Rua Maestro Cardim, 1170 - Paraiso
V Olimpia
Sao Paulo SP 01323-001, São Paulo 04546-042
Brazil

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