Profitability, Mean Reversion of Leverage Ratios, and Capital Structure Choices

47 Pages Posted: 15 Oct 2004

See all articles by Long Chen

Long Chen

Cheung Kong Graduate School of Business; Luohan Academy

Xinlei Shelly Zhao

Government of the United States of America - Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) - Risk Analysis Division

Date Written: February 2005

Abstract

We seek economic interpretations for two well-known empirical regularities. First, it is well known that more profitable firms tend to have lower leverage ratios, a pattern driven by the preference on internal funds by these profitable firms. Some recent theoretical development has used transaction costs or dynamic tax considerations to explain this phenomenon. We show that the phenomenon largely remains even after these factors are controlled for. Second, through both theoretical and empirical illustrations, we show that leverage ratios can revert to mean mechanically regardless of which theory better describes financial decisions; and that opposite inferences can be drawn depending on whether financing decisions or leverage ratio changes are studies. Therefore, leverage ratio changes might not be informative in distinguishing the competing theories. Our finding cautions against the common practice of relying on the dynamics of leverage ratio changes to draw conclusions on the validity of capital structure theories.

Keywords: Capital structure, tradeoff theory, pecking order theory, profitability

JEL Classification: G32

Suggested Citation

Chen, Long and Chen, Long and Zhao, Xinlei, Profitability, Mean Reversion of Leverage Ratios, and Capital Structure Choices (February 2005). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=666992 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.666992

Long Chen (Contact Author)

Cheung Kong Graduate School of Business ( email )

Oriental Plaza, Tower E3
One East Chang An Avenue
Beijing, 100738
China

Luohan Academy ( email )

No. 556, Xixi Road, Z Space
Xihu District
Hangzhou, Zhejiang 310013
China
+86-0571-2688-8888-75520 (Phone)

Xinlei Zhao

Government of the United States of America - Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) - Risk Analysis Division ( email )

400 7th Street SW
Washington, DC 20219
United States

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