Anti-Dumping Duties and the Byrd Amendment

25 Pages Posted: 8 Mar 2005

See all articles by David Collie

David Collie

Cardiff University - Cardiff Business School

Hylke Vandenbussche

Catholic University of Leuven (KUL), CEPR

Date Written: December 2004

Abstract

The Byrd amendment to US anti-dumping law distributes the revenue from anti-dumping duties imposed on foreign firms to the domestic firms that lodged the complaint of dumping. This Paper shows that the presence of the Byrd Amendment can yield lower duties and greater welfare than in its absence. This result holds when the US government puts a sufficient weight on the profits of the domestic industry in the welfare function. A sufficient condition for this result is that the market share of the domestic industry exceeds 50%, which applies in most US anti-dumping cases.

Keywords: Dumping, tariffs, US trade policy, world trade organization

JEL Classification: F12, F13

Suggested Citation

Collie, David R. and Vandenbussche, Hylke, Anti-Dumping Duties and the Byrd Amendment (December 2004). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=667924

David R. Collie

Cardiff University - Cardiff Business School ( email )

Colum Drive
Cardiff, CF10 3EU
United Kingdom
+44 29 2087 6815 (Phone)
+44 29 2084 4419 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.collie.org.uk

Hylke Vandenbussche (Contact Author)

Catholic University of Leuven (KUL), CEPR ( email )

Faculty of Economics
Naamsestraat 69
B-3000 Leuven, 3000
Belgium
+32 16 326 920 (Phone)
+32 16 326 732 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: https://www.sites.google.com/site/vandenbusschehylke/home-1

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