Pressure Groups and Political Advertising: How Uninformed Voters Can Use Strategic Rules of Thumb

UC Santa Cruz Economics Working Paper No. 589

36 Pages Posted: 27 Feb 2005

See all articles by Donald Wittman

Donald Wittman

University of California, Santa Cruz - Department of Economics

Date Written: February 2005

Abstract

This paper shows how uninformed but rational voters can respond intelligently to political advertising.

The paper models a situation where a candidate must rely on a pressure group for financing political advertising. The pressure group uses its power over the purse to influence the position chosen by the candidate. Nevertheless, when uninformed voters use a strategic rule of thumb, pressure-group contributions always move the outcome of the election closer to the median voter. By using such a rule of thumb, when there is advertising, uninformed voters can have the same influence on the election as informed voters.

Keywords: Candidates, pressure groups, elections, uninformed voters

JEL Classification: D7

Suggested Citation

Wittman, Donald, Pressure Groups and Political Advertising: How Uninformed Voters Can Use Strategic Rules of Thumb (February 2005). UC Santa Cruz Economics Working Paper No. 589, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=672543 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.672543

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