Mixed Equilibria in Games of Strategic Complements Are Unstable
Posted: 14 Apr 2005
There are 2 versions of this paper
Mixed Equilibria in Games of Strategic Complements are Unstable
UC Berkeley Competition Policy Center Working Paper No. CPC02-27
Number of pages: 23
Posted: 16 Feb 2004
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Abstract
In games with strict strategic complementarities, properly mixed Nash equilibria - equilibria that are not in pure strategies - are unstable for a broad class of learning dynamics.
Keywords: Mmixed-strategy equilibrium, learning, supermodular games, strategic complementarities, equilibrium selection
JEL Classification: C72, C73
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Echenique, Federico and Edlin, Aaron S., Mixed Equilibria in Games of Strategic Complements Are Unstable. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=691370
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