The Judicial Signaling Game: How Judges Shape Their Dockets

54 Pages Posted: 6 Apr 2005

See all articles by Tonja Jacobi

Tonja Jacobi

Emory University School of Law

Abstract

Contrary to traditional wisdom, judges are not passive receivers of their agendas. Instead, many judges attempt to shape their dockets by encouraging potential litigants to bring particular cases. This encouragement takes the form of judges signaling their own positions on an issue as well as their colleagues' expected support. This process is modeled as a signaling game, with both separating and pooling equilibria resulting. The existence of pooling equilibria is of particular interest, as it indicates some judges misrepresent the chances of success of a case in order to induce desired legislation.

Keywords: Courts, information asymmetry, agenda setting, certiorari, litigation

JEL Classification: C72, D81, D82, K41

Suggested Citation

Jacobi, Tonja, The Judicial Signaling Game: How Judges Shape Their Dockets. Supreme Court Economic Review, 2006, Northwestern Law & Econ Research Paper No. 05-09, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=691467 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.691467

Tonja Jacobi (Contact Author)

Emory University School of Law ( email )

1301 Clifton Road
Atlanta, GA 30322
United States

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