How Does Health Insurance Affect Workers' Compensation Filing?

RAND Institute for Civil Justice Working Paper No. WR-205-1-ICJ

38 Pages Posted: 21 Apr 2005

See all articles by Darius N. Lakdawalla

Darius N. Lakdawalla

University of Southern California - Schaeffer Center for Health Policy and Economics; RAND Corporation; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Robert T. Reville

RAND Corporation - Institute for Civil Justice

Seth A. Seabury

University of Southern California - Keck School of Medicine; University of Southern California - Schaeffer Center for Health Policy and Economics

Date Written: April 2005

Abstract

Workers' compensation provides insurance against job-related injuries, but one-third to one-half of injured workers choose not to file. Previous analysts have presumed this to result in part from private health insurance, an alternative source of health care that may discourage insured workers from taking the time to file a workers' compensation claim. However, data from the NLSY paint a much different and more troubling picture: uninsured and more vulnerable workers are less likely to file claims than the insured. We study this relationship and find that it emerges as the result of employer characteristics. Workers at firms who offer health insurance to employees are more likely to file workers' compensation claims: the characteristics of the firm are more important than the insurance status of workers themselves; moreover, even repeat injury sufferers are more likely to file during episodes in which their employer offers health insurance. This suggests that the workplace environment and employer incentives may have a significant impact on the utilization of the workers' compensation system.

Keywords: Workers' Compensation, Health Insurance, Claims Filing

JEL Classification: J38

Suggested Citation

Lakdawalla, Darius N. and Reville, Robert T. and Seabury, Seth A., How Does Health Insurance Affect Workers' Compensation Filing? (April 2005). RAND Institute for Civil Justice Working Paper No. WR-205-1-ICJ, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=702062 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.702062

Darius N. Lakdawalla

University of Southern California - Schaeffer Center for Health Policy and Economics ( email )

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RAND Corporation ( email )

P.O. Box 2138
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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
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Robert T. Reville

RAND Corporation - Institute for Civil Justice ( email )

1776 Main Street
Santa Monica, CA
United States

Seth A. Seabury (Contact Author)

University of Southern California - Keck School of Medicine ( email )

2250 Alcazar Street
Los Angeles, CA 90089
United States

University of Southern California - Schaeffer Center for Health Policy and Economics ( email )

635 Downey Way
Los Angeles, CA 90089-3333
United States

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