A Note on the Impossibility of a Satisfactory Concept of Stability for Coalition Formation Games
IEW Working Paper No. 238
11 Pages Posted: 20 Apr 2005
Date Written: April 2005
Abstract
In this note we show that no solution to coalition formation games can satisfy a set of axioms that we propose as reasonable. Our result points out that solutions to the coalition formation cannot be interpreted as predictions of what would be resting points for a game in the way stable coalition structures are usually interpreted.
Keywords: Hedonic game, coalition formation, stability
JEL Classification: C71
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Gerber, Anke and Barberà Sàndez, Salvador, A Note on the Impossibility of a Satisfactory Concept of Stability for Coalition Formation Games (April 2005). IEW Working Paper No. 238, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=703502 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.703502
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