A Note on the Impossibility of a Satisfactory Concept of Stability for Coalition Formation Games

IEW Working Paper No. 238

11 Pages Posted: 20 Apr 2005

See all articles by Anke Gerber

Anke Gerber

Universität Hamburg

Salvador Barberà

Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona

Date Written: April 2005

Abstract

In this note we show that no solution to coalition formation games can satisfy a set of axioms that we propose as reasonable. Our result points out that solutions to the coalition formation cannot be interpreted as predictions of what would be resting points for a game in the way stable coalition structures are usually interpreted.

Keywords: Hedonic game, coalition formation, stability

JEL Classification: C71

Suggested Citation

Gerber, Anke and Barberà Sàndez, Salvador, A Note on the Impossibility of a Satisfactory Concept of Stability for Coalition Formation Games (April 2005). IEW Working Paper No. 238, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=703502 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.703502

Anke Gerber (Contact Author)

Universität Hamburg ( email )

Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences
Von-Melle-Park 5
Hamburg, 20146
Germany

Salvador Barberà Sàndez

Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona ( email )

Edifici B - Campus Bellaterra
Barcelona, 08193
Spain

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