Precedent Transfer in Coordination Games: An Experiment
Posted: 26 Apr 2005
Abstract
We consider the power of precedent transfer as an equilibrium selection principle in the minimum effort game. Our experiments show that groups of players are able to transfer efficient historical precedents to the minimum effort game.
Keywords: coordination, historical precedent, information
JEL Classification: C72, C92
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Devetag, Giovanna, Precedent Transfer in Coordination Games: An Experiment. Economics Letters, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=705723
Feedback
Feedback to SSRN
If you need immediate assistance, call 877-SSRNHelp (877 777 6435) in the United States, or +1 212 448 2500 outside of the United States, 8:30AM to 6:00PM U.S. Eastern, Monday - Friday.