Form of Compensation and Managerial Decision Horizon

Abstract

This paper investigates the relation between the form of compensation and the manager's decision horizon. It finds that while all-cash contracts induce managers to underinvest in the long-term, all-stock contracts induce overinvestment in the long-term. It shows that compensation contracts consisting of both cash and restricted stock can produce efficient investment, thereby providing a rationale for the existence of both cash and stock incentive schemes in executive compensation packages. This explains why the adoption of either type of incentive scheme results in a positive stock price reaction. In addition, the paper derives the following testable hypotheses: (i) the proportion of the stock compensation is decreasing in the precision of the manager's ability and increasing in the precision of the firm's cash flows; (ii) firms compensate their managers with proportionately more stock in profitable years and proportionately more cash in leaner years; (iii) the greater the growth opportunities the higher the proportion of stock compensation.

JEL Classification: G30, J33