Corporate Governance Convergence: Evidence from Takeover Regulation Reforms

39 Pages Posted: 22 Apr 2005

See all articles by Marc Goergen

Marc Goergen

IE Business School, IE University; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Marina Martynova

U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission

Luc Renneboog

Tilburg University - Department of Finance; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC)

Date Written: April 2005

Abstract

This paper contributes to the research on corporate governance by predicting the effects of European takeover regulation. In particular, we investigate whether the recent reforms of takeover regulation in Europe are leading to a harmonization of the national legislations. With the help of 150 corporate governance lawyers, we collected the main changes in takeover regulation for 30 European countries. We assess whether a process of convergence towards the Anglo-(American) corporate governance system has been started. We conclude that this is the case. We make predictions as to the consequences of the reforms for ownership and control. We find that, while in some countries the adoption of a unified takeover code may result in dispersed ownership, in others it may further consolidate the blockholder-based system.

Keywords: takeover regulation, mergers and acquisitions, corporate governance

JEL Classification: G3, G34, G38, K2, K22, K40, G32

Suggested Citation

Goergen, Marc and Martynova, Marina and Renneboog, Luc, Corporate Governance Convergence: Evidence from Takeover Regulation Reforms (April 2005). ECGI - Law Working Paper No. 33/2005, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=709023 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.709023

Marc Goergen

IE Business School, IE University ( email )

Finance Department
Maria de Molina, 12
Madrid, 28006
Spain

HOME PAGE: http://www.ie.edu/business-school/faculty-and-research/faculty/marc-goergen/

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org

Marina Martynova (Contact Author)

U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission ( email )

100 F St. NE
Washington, DC 20549
United States

Luc Renneboog

Tilburg University - Department of Finance ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Warandelaan 2
5000 LE Tilburg
Netherlands
+13 31 466 8210 (Phone)
+13 31 466 2875 (Fax)

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC) ( email )

Warandelaan 2
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

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