Overcomplying for Profit
Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Vol. 6, No. 4, pp. 267-269, 2005
Posted: 9 May 2005
Abstract
To maximize their profit, multinationals can design and implement the same and toughest standard in all locations, regardless of domestic regulations. We discuss this kind of overcompliance and stress its underpinnings. Some potential extensions are suggested.
Keywords: Overcompliance, Regulation, Home/Host Country, Standards
JEL Classification: L51, Q52
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Mzoughi, Naoufel and Grolleau, Gilles, Overcomplying for Profit. Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Vol. 6, No. 4, pp. 267-269, 2005, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=717501
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