The Ecology of Collective Action: A Public Goods and Sanctions Experiment with Controlled Group Formation

Brown University Department of Economics Paper No. 2004-01

44 Pages Posted: 18 May 2005

See all articles by Umut Ones

Umut Ones

Brown University - Department of Economics

Louis Putterman

Brown University - Department of Economics

Date Written: 2004

Abstract

Mounting evidence suggests that the outcomes of laboratory public goods games, and collective action in firms, communities, and polities, reflect the presence in most groups of individuals having differing preferences and beliefs. We designed a public goods experiment with targeted punishment opportunities to (a) confirm subject heterogeneity, (b) test the stability of subjects' types and (c) test the proposition that differences in group outcomes can be predicted with knowledge of the types of individuals who compose those groups. We demonstrate that differences in the inclination to cooperate have considerable persistence, that differences in levels of cooperation after many periods of repeated interaction can be significantly predicted by differences in inclination to cooperate which are manifested in the initial periods, and that significantly greater social efficiency can be achieved by grouping less cooperative subjects with those inclined to punish free riding while excluding those prone to perverse retaliation against cooperators.

Keywords: public goods, voluntary contribution mechanism, heterogeneous

JEL Classification: D91, D92, H41, D23

Suggested Citation

Ones, Umut and Putterman, Louis G., The Ecology of Collective Action: A Public Goods and Sanctions Experiment with Controlled Group Formation (2004). Brown University Department of Economics Paper No. 2004-01, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=724184 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.724184

Umut Ones

Brown University - Department of Economics ( email )

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Louis G. Putterman (Contact Author)

Brown University - Department of Economics ( email )

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