Information Transmission in Coalitional Voting Games

Brown University Economics Working Paper No. 2005-01

28 Pages Posted: 18 May 2005

See all articles by Rajiv Vohra

Rajiv Vohra

Brown University - Department of Economics

Roberto Serrano

Brown University

Date Written: January 2005

Abstract

A core allocation of a complete information economy can be characterized as one that would not be unanimously rejected in favor of another feasible alternative by any coalition. We use this test of coalitional voting in an incomplete information environment to formalize a notion of resilience. Since information transmission is implicit in the Bayesian equilibria of such voting games, this approach makes it possible to derive core concepts in which the transmission of information among members of a coalition is endogenous. Our results lend support to the credible core of Dutta and Vohra (2003) and the core proposed by Myerson (2003) as two that can be justified in terms of coalitional voting.

Keywords: Core, Incomplete Information, Coalitional Voting, Resilience, Mediation

JEL Classification: C71, C72, D51, D82

Suggested Citation

Vohra, Rajiv and Serrano, Roberto, Information Transmission in Coalitional Voting Games (January 2005). Brown University Economics Working Paper No. 2005-01, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=724235 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.724235

Rajiv Vohra

Brown University - Department of Economics ( email )

Box B
Providence, RI 02912
United States
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Roberto Serrano (Contact Author)

Brown University ( email )

64 Waterman Street
Providence, RI 02912
United States
401-863-1036 (Phone)
401-863-1970 (Fax)

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